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1. The Concept of Creative Industries and its 
Implications for the Multi-functional Exhibition Hall 
(MFEH) 
 
Given at the symposium: Towards a Newer Silk Road 
Multifunctional Exhibition Hall International Workshop 
 
Gwangju 29th May 2010 
 
In this paper I want to discuss the idea of the creative industries and the new agenda it 
has set for many national and local governments in Europe, North America and 
increasingly in Asia. I want to explore its possible relationship to the activities of the 
MFEH; but in so doing I want to challenge some of its interpretations and suggest that 
in this challenge lies the possibility of a unique role for the MFEH and Gwangju in 
general.  
 
The term ‘creative industries’ was invented in 1998 by the new minister Chris Smith 
who needed to convince the Economics Department that it should give more money to 
his new Department of Culture Media and Sport (DCMS). The word ‘culture’ 
sounded like ‘art’ and that was not going to convince the economists that it was 
crucial to the future of the UK. So they quickly renamed the ‘cultural industries’ as 
the ‘creative industries’. In some ways then, the origin of ‘creative industries lies in 
purely pragmatic policy and politics. 
 
But like all these things a pragmatic move reflects wider shifts in attitudes and 
understandings. In speaking of the history of CIs today I want to give four  stories, 
four narratives of where the idea comes from and what is at stake. These stories are 
very important for the thinking around the MFEH in Gwanju. 
 
Story One: Re-thinking the Cultural Industries  
 
The first relates to those very ‘cultural industries’ which were so hastily renamed in 
1998. The renaming was controversial. I had been involved in cultural industries 
policies for 10 years, and I was not alone in thinking that the shift to creative 
industries was somehow wrong or incoherent. I will return to this. 
 
From the perspective of ‘cultural industries’ the ideas associated with ‘creative 
industries in fact have a long history. It is usual to begin with Adorno, who invented 
the term and with whom it was long associated. He came at the end of a long tradition 
of aesthetic theory, going back to the 18th century, but now coloured by avant-garde 
modernism, Marxism and the catastrophe of Fascism.  
 
I don’t want to go into this in detail. Just to say he has been over simplified – reduced 
to a defender of ‘high culture’ against ‘mass’ or ‘popular’ culture. He is more than 
this. When he talked about Hollywood, US TV, Radio and Pop music, he was not so 
much talking about the commercialization of culture but its industrialization – it being 
subject to a machine-like production process. What became known as ‘Fordism’. Its 
products were standardized repetitions of ‘effects’ that encouraged its audience to 
respond like machines to these effects. It was the endless repetition of the same. The 
purpose, in this ‘mass society’, was to keep the workers happy and relaxed so they 
could go to work the next day. 
 
In the late 1960s these ideas were picked up again, but subjected to more serious 
scrutiny. By that time the culture industry – TV, Radio, Film, recorded music, 
newspapers and publishing, advertising, and so on – were of much greater importance 
economically but also culturally. It was impossible to ignore them or their effects. 
What these effects were was debated. For many they were about American (or 
Japanese) mass culture; they undermined the identity of the nation; they were 
imperialist etc. For many others, popular culture was a source of new energies and 
social change.  
 
However they were interpreted (and we will return to this) they gave rise to academic 
investigation as to how exactly they worked. Many working with ‘political economy’, 
often Marxist in inspiration, suggested that Adorno had got it wrong. 
 
1) that these were not ‘ideological’ industries aimed at keeping the workers 
happy; they were themselves commodities and needed (at least in market 
economies) to make money to survive. 
2) That they therefore had to appeal to what people wanted – they had to have a 
‘use value’ for the audience. This included novelty not repetition but also a 
certain sense of meaning or even ‘authenticity’.  
3) That each different branch had a different way of monetizing its products: 
Physical products (Records/CD); or control of access (Film; live performance) 
or free/ cheap linked to advertising revenue (TV; Newspapers). All these 
introduced different dynamics. 
 
Therefore: 
 
1) there was not a culture industry but cultural industries. They were not one unified 
sector, nor were they some propaganda department of the state – their need for profits 
often went against the state (censorship, new technologies of copying etc.).  
 
2) ‘cultural value’ is the basis of economic value – and this introduced a lot of 
uncertainty into the process. It was impossible to know in advance what this ‘cultural 
value’ might be. The audiences were volatile and unpredictable. 9 out of 10 products 
fail – the successes subsidize the failures. There are ways of managing this (genres, 
stars, sequels, formulas, back catalogues, special editions, marketing) but essentially it 
was about ‘rationalising the irrational’.  
 
3) the reduction of the artists or ‘creative workers’ to factory workers never happened. 
Many remained freelancers or very small businesses; even salaried workers had a 
high degree of autonomy. Of course this could be seen as free R&D – the creatives 
develop ideas at their own expense on low incomes – or a ‘reserve army’ where there 
were so many creatives wanting work that it kept wages down. But whatever this was 
it was not mass factory production.  
 
How one managed the volatility of consumption was one issue; but how to manage 
highly skilled, autonomous and often awkward creative input was also a major 
problem. Each branch of the cultural industries evolved all sorts of ways to manage 
this. They became complex and sophisticated ‘industries’ or ‘ecosystems’; they have 
been faced by rapid technological and social change (the internet is now a major 
challenge) but there are also longer term continuities in how they adapt and evolve.  
 
4) The energies of popular and commercial cultures could not be ignored. Not only 
did most cultural consumption come from this sector not from public funded art, but 
the artistic aspirations and cultural creativity often surpassed these ‘official’ arts. 
From the later 1970s onwards many in Europe, North America and Australia – mostly 
at the urban level – began to suggest that a modern democratic cultural policy could 
not ignore this sector. New kinds of cultural policy emerged which looked to develop 
the cultural industries for economic and social, as well as cultural reasons.  
 
 
Story Two: Creative Industries as the New Economy 
 
Up to 1980s the cultural industries were something of an anomaly, a survival of 
handcraft or artisanal production. This was at a period when small businesses were 
still seen as unviable and that concentration into large conglomerates was the way to 
achieve economic modernization.  
 
In late 1980s early 1990s this changed. The cultural industries went from being a 
strange survival from an earlier epoch, to cutting edge industries; not a hangover from 
the old but a template for the new.  
 
What the new creative industries argument emphasises is the productive use of artistic 
or cultural creativity, and it does so by making new connections between economy 
and culture. In short, that art and industry have been falsely divided for two long, that 
they are now coming together to produce a new kind of economy. 
 
How are we to understand this? 
 
New Labour defined the creative industries thus:  
 
“those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent 
and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation 
and exploitation of intellectual property.” 
 
There were a number of criticisms of this. For example, it stresses individual rather 
than complex ‘industries’ or ecosystems and it emphasises intellectual property – and 
this is not the main source of income for most creative businesses (more about large 
corporations) nor owned by those who actually produce it. 
 
But my issue here is with the idea of creativity. It becomes the central defining 
characteristic of these individuals and businesses. In fact, as a newly identified 
competitive input it is to be extended from CIs to many other parts of the economy 
and social life. It becomes a central driver of innovation, an abstract  ‘input’ into a 
system or a ‘capacity’ to be developed in an individual, group or society. 
 
We get books and reports and courses on creativity. Psychological  - ‘the creative 
mind’; Neurological – left/ right brain; Anthropological – human ingenuity/ problem 
solving as ‘hard wired’; Educational – techniques to promote it. 
 
But  what is not creative? We find ‘creativity’ in science, business, everyday life etc. 
John Howkins The Creative Economy includes patents, trademarks, designs, 
copyright – in fact making money from ideas covers a vast area. Richard Florida’s 
Creative Class includes lawyers, scientists, accountants, doctors, more of less anyone 
who is not blue collar. Where can we sensibly draw the boundaries? If creativity is 
everywhere what distinguishes artistic or ‘cultural’ creativity from these other kinds?  
 
The idea of man as a creative being goes back at least to the renaissance and is one of 
the central philosophical and historical concerns of the last 300 years. So we need to 
be historically specific about what we mean by ‘creativity’ otherwise it returns to the 
banal and the purely ideological. 
 
This story in part derived from Post-Fordism. Here flexible specialisation, 
outsourcing, new forms of management and co-ordination linked to ICT contribute to 
a knowledge and network economy and society. 
 
In this knowledge workers are essential. This has a long history: white collar workers, 
the rise of the service industries, the new middle class, Daniel Bell’s ‘symbol 
workers’. These taken over by Castells: his network society depends on the 
production and manipulation of symbols, and this a ‘cultural’ capacity in the 
educational sense. 
 
In 1990s this became linked to the cultural industries. These reflected the new post-
fordist industries in structure – highly networked, flexible, clusters of sub-contracting 
micro-businesses – but they were cutting edge in terms of their relationship to new, 
fluid markets.  
 
The difficult business model we talked about was based, first, on volatile, 
unpredictable audiences and how to manage this and, second, around the management 
of creatives who could somehow produce for this market – who had a cultural or 
emotional connection which allowed them to anticipate it in some way.  
 
As Andy Pratt says – creative industries are no more creative that any other industry – 
by which he means that they don’t have a magic aura - but that their business model 
demands constant innovation and intense relationship to existing and potential 
audiences/ markets. In this they are simply leading the way for the more general 
evolution of post-functional market goods and services. 
 
It is in this sense that the specifically productive nature of artistic labour (or at least its 
complex management and organisation) comes into the foreground. This is when the 
‘artist’ become exemplar for the entrepreneur. 
 
This can be seen in management literature. Schumpeter had defined the entrepreneur 
as the rule breaker, the one that was not driven by profit – or at least not just by profit 
– but by a desire to create new markets. He adopted Marx’s notion of ‘creative 
destruction’. This made the entrepreneur a heroic figure, not the conformist 
‘organisation man’ but the rebel, the radical, outcast. It is clear that there are many 
parallels with the figure of the modernist artist – the rebel, breaking the rules, 
smashing the icons, going forward into the unknown future. In management books 
from the 1980s onwards it was the rule breakers, the rebels who were the new 
business leaders and they were explicitly modelled on artists.  
 
It is in this sense that the artist, the creatives move closer to business, to economics 
and where they were once seen as anti-market they now seen as having the secrets to 
access to these new markets. It is for this reason we now have such interest in the 
creative industries. 
 
Story Three: Post-Materialist Consumer Capitalism 
 
But these ideas themselves are set against a much broader story. And I think it is 
particularly interesting for Asian societies and something I’m thinking about at the 
moment regarding China. 
 
First, there is a growing market for cultural goods as the statistics show. The ‘cultural’ 
or ‘symbolic’ input into previously purely functional goods and services is a real 
phenomena. Those industries that provide these are increasing faster than other 
sectors and provide employment and economic growth. How do we explain this? 
 
The most basic ideas relate to rising levels of education, leisure and money. Of 
course; but we must remember that this is not some automatic or natural growth – 
people have to learn or be directed in various ways. For example, the Chinese 
government showing people what a ‘hobby’ is – how to use leisure in a productive 
way – and how not to use it badly. But how ‘education, leisure and money’ are 
change society is one central to the politics (in the largest sense, of how we should 
live together) of our time. It is by no means a singular path. 
 
In the West this has been linked to a story of a ‘second modernity’ since the 1960s; 
and globalisation has ensured that versions of this story are now very present in 
developed and developing Asian countries.  It’s a big story, too big to go into here, 
but I refer to some broad transformations of consumption and markets, usually 
described as a move from mass to niche consumption.  
 
Mass consumption was linked to Fordism, with its predictable and manageable line of 
product development, production and marketing; niche consumption is post-fordist, 
with volatile and unpredictable markets. This in turn reflects deeper cultural changes 
– where the individual is required not just to follow what everybody else does but to 
exercise judgement, discernment, about what to chose from an ever growing range of 
products. More, the individual is now seen to get their identity not from the group or 
class but to make this identity, to construct it for themselves. This relates to wider 
transformations in the ‘welfare state’ and conditions of work: – individuals are now 
much more responsible for their own life, career, health, education. In the west a  
crucial part of this is the construction of ‘identity’ through the consumption of cultural 
goods – what has been called ‘the aestheticisation of  everyday life’.  
 
The dominating model for this is Maslow’s famous Hierarchy of Needs. This goes 
from Basic Safety Needs - Needs of Love, Affection and Belongingness - Needs for 
Esteem -  Needs for Self-Actualization. This relates also to Robert Ingehart’s idea of 
‘post-material values’. These powerful cultural currents - called by one ‘the 
expressive revolution’ - have radically changed the nature of western society. 
 
We can see where the economic productivity of artistic creativity comes in – artists 
are those best able to produce for these new markets, to work in its complex and 
volatile circuits. And they are organised within a business sector characterised by 
‘soft skills’, essential to anybody working in this difficult business model. 
 
Thus Schumpeterian rule breakers perfectly suited to this market. They are adept in 
these new languages. They move within areas of desire and value in ways 
unthinkable even a decade ago. There are new kinds of jobs my father would not 
recognise as a job. They aim to satisfy needs many people did not even realise were 
needs.  
 
There have been many discussions about ‘bourgeois- bohemians’ and how  the 
‘counter-culture’ of the 1960s was not about rebellion but simply a new form of 
consumption developing on the margins of society - now become mainstream. Indeed, 
this is the way a lot of arts funding is frequently justified in creative industry policy: 
as ‘R&D’, cutting edge, experimental developments which will eventually feed into 
the mainstream as commercial products. In this context is it no wonder that many no 
longer fear the ‘industrialisation of culture’ but the industrialisation of everyday life.  
 
These transformations have very special implications for Asian societies – and 
especially China about which I know more. Innovation and creativity are being 
promoted across the region as the new means by which economies can become 
competitive – moving away from low-value manufacture to more R&D and design 
intensive goods and services. The ‘creativity’ demanded from the new human capital, 
the ‘soft skills’ which will both create and respond to the new kinds of ‘creative’ or 
post-materialist consumers – these imply a certain kind of social and cultural 
development which many Asian societies have resisted. Sometimes in terms of 
cultural tradition – Asian values etc. – sometimes because of more explicit political 
values – the residual collectivism of Chinese socialism rather than ‘anarchic’ 
individualism.  
 
This story of creativity and the ‘individualisation of identity’ as a new source of 
economic growth – limited as it is to the purely economic - involves a set of deeper 
cultural transformation which may or may not be welcome by policy makers or 
political, social, cultural, religious leaders. Note the Chinese separation of cultural and 
creative industries for one. 
 
Which leads me to the fourth and final story. 
 
Story Four: Creative Industries and Democracy 
 
It is undeniable that what happened in the 1960s in terms of culture had profound 
impacts on the consumption markets and eventually the production economics of the 
advanced capitalist economies. 
 
But I want to tell a different story about this process, and argue that it came from a set 
of social, cultural and political aspirations for democratic change. Where such 
impulses came from is of course a huge question and I only want to highlight a few 
ideas. 
 
Some suggest the impulse came from a discontent amongst some groups – maybe we 
can call them the ‘knowledge workers’ - with mass society, Fordism, ‘welfare state 
capitalism’. In short, with the way in which modern bureaucratic capitalism and 
welfare states were organised and its definitions of what constituted ‘the good life’.  
 
In response to an endless accumulation of material goods they wanted some sense of 
meaning or spiritual purpose. At a more basic level perhaps, rather than seeing work 
as a step by step rise up the ladder they wanted it to be meaningful and satisfying.  
 
At a more general level they suggested that ones social role should not be given by 
‘society’ but created by the individual. Rather than ‘doing ones duty’ being the true 
form of life ones real duty was to become an individual, to develop ones own talents, 
to express oneself, to be – in short – creative. 
 
It is clear how these feed into ‘creative economy’ theories and even into Richard 
Florida’s ‘creative class’. But I think there is a much wider story. 
 
It was in the 1960s that many of these discontents or aspirations became part of 
‘popular culture’. Since the later 18th century in Europe part of the mission of ‘Art’ 
was to criticise the materialist market driven world of capitalism as well as the 
rationalist view of knowledge that went with it. Art wanted to ‘change life’ in the 
French poet Rimbaud’s words. This ‘artistic critique of capitalism’ always went side 
by side with the more material social critique of capitalism. The urban cultural 
movements associated with ‘cultural industries’ formed part of this – a concern with 
new forms of cultural and urban democracy, widening its definition beyond formal 
mechanisms to include new kinds of participation and cultural involvement.  
 
I would suggest that in the 1980s and 1990s these two concerns – the ‘artistic’ and the 
‘social’ critiques – separated to some degree. On the one hand de-industrialisation 
undermined the power of labour and resulted in a struggle to retain right and living 
standards. On the other ‘change life’ could become associated with ‘lifestyle’ 
consumption and become uncoupled from any attachment to wider politics. 
Postmodernism might be the name for this.  
 
But this separation has always been exaggerated, and other tendencies have always 
tried to put these together. This can be found in popular cultures such as ‘rave’, in 
ecology movements, in anti-globalisation and in the cultural politics of the internet 
and ‘creative commons’.  
 
Consequences for Asian Society? 
 
We saw suggested that the ‘expressive revolution’ involved powerful currents of 
social change. Asian societies wanting ‘creativity’ need to know how this is linked to 
these wider cultural shifts, and they might be very wary of it. But it will be difficult to 
avoid some engagement with this, because the ‘creative workers’ on which this sector 
relies, which are crucial to the idea of the creative industries, are deeply reliant on 
these cultural shifts.  
 
The new cultural entrepreneurs who are the heroes of creativity also came out of this 
transformation of culture and society. They too wanted to break with the 9-5; to have 
meaningful work not just work for wages; to make artistic or creative products; to 
change life. The new creative entrepreneurs who are central to the productive force of 
the creative industries were also involved in these cultural transformations. 
 
They did not look to government subsidy but to the market – but not the kind of mass 
market of mainstream products but small, niche, often local, markets. They had to 
make money, but also wanted to make meaning; they wanted work but on particular 
terms. Unlike others they did not maximize growth but looked to develop organically 
in line with their ideals and aspirations. Many of these linked to these wider social, 
cultural and political aspirations for change. 
 
The business model of the creative industries we discussed above, which relates to the 
production of symbolic or cultural value in new niche and volatile markets remains a 
very difficult business model. But its challenges are not just of a technical character - 
something to be solved a clever person from the Harvard Business School – but 
reflect deeper socio-cultural tensions, dynamics, and conflicts. Some still call this 
culture versus capitalism; I think this is, at very least, too simplistic. It is quite clear 
that culture is now extremely productive for capitalism. But there are within this 
conflicts, refusals, oppositions and critiques that we have to take account of.  
 
In Asia, for example, the renegotiation of the individual and society that, in the West, 
took place under the banner of creativity and culture, will take place in very different 
circumstances. This has consequences for CI policy. But it presents all policy with a 
problem. Creative industries generate economic value from cultural value; but this 
process of turning cultural into economic value is extremely complex and goes 
through many circuitous routes which are unpredictable and not easily managed. 
Indeed, some parts of this circuit are actively opposed to the attempts to turn it into 
economic policy.  
 
In this context the exhortations to creativity are rather lame – a much deeper 
engagement has to take place if creative industries are to happen. And this is part of a 
wider engagement with contemporary global modernity and the prospects and dangers 
it holds for us. 
 
Consequences for Gwangju 
 
The CIs can have positive charge – but they can also be the economic reduction of 
culture. As we saw China is facing real problems with uncoupling the ‘creative’ 
element from wider democratic aspirations – and I mean this is the widest sense of 
democracy. 
 
Gwanju is a city associated internationally with 18th May events. Rather than just be 
another ‘creative city’ it could be the one that looks towards bottom up grass roots 
movements; towards social solidarity and democracy. How can these values help a 
city socially and economically challenged – this seems to me to be the biggest 
challenge for the MFEH. It is high risk but its one that would mark it out as utterly 
unique in Asia. A creative laboratory which links creative industries to the widest 
social, cultural and political creativity as well as merely economic growth. 
 
How? Two important changes have occurred in the last 15 years. First, the rise of the 
internet and the ability of citizens and consumers to feed back into production, to 
engage in production themselves, and to organize themselves and these activities into 
virtual social networks. The implications are not restricted to the impacts on the 
profitability of the older cultural industries but new ways of communication, creation 
and self-organisation. Second, and following from this, is the rise of ‘urban 
infomatics’: cities now produce a vast range of information which is available on-line, 
through mobile, through urban screens and other devices (ubiquitous computing).  
The ability of citizens to actively engage with urban space, political decisions, 
cultural and communal representation is something only just being realized. So too 
are the skills required to do this. 
 
A new kind of urbanism and a new kind of citizen, a new kind of cultural politics is 
emerging which is trying to assert the grass roots democracy and social solidarity 
against the consumerist, business growth at all (social and cultural) costs model that 
has dominated in the last two decades and has brought cities, countries and the 
environment into real peril.  
 
Is not the MFEH a space in which these ideas can be explored, new skills learned, 
new kinds of democracy and social solidarity practices – in a city which gave rise to 
modern Korean Democracy? 
 
Thank you 
 
2.  Road/ Street 
 
Paper on potential themes for the Asian Cultural Hub – Gwangju, South Korea 
 
Having read the papers by the Korean colleagues from the previous forum on the 
theme of Road, and having had the opportunity to visit the site and discuss with the 
research team and others, I do think there are some clear themes emerging.  
 
First though, whilst I think that the involvement of artists is most welcome it seems 
there is no desire to have this as a contemporary art gallery. The theme is certainly 
culture, but viewed in its more anthropological sense.  
 
Road is used in two senses.  
 
First as a route, an established connection along which people travel to a destination. 
Antony Sheldon interpreted this in the form of a ‘way’, or a ‘path’ (made by many 
people following an informal route made by ‘word of mouth’) recalling a progress 
towards religious or cultural knowledge. This might be echoed in the French word 
sens – direction – which can also mean sense (or nonsense). Linked to this is the set 
of connections and exchanges between cultures symbolized by the Silk Road or the 
Tea Road and by the great routes of pilgrimage. These are well established roads on 
which the encounter of civilizations and cultures take place; and they also symbolize 
the path through life, or a process of education through encounter with ‘the world’. 
 
Though these are very rich ideas (and have clearly been attractive to the organisers 
who called the international workshop Towards a Newer Silk Road) I don’t think we 
can address this aspect without being aware of the more recent dimensions that road 
has acquired. Though Anthony Sheldon is again correct is pointing to extensive global 
interconnections prior to what we now call ‘globalisation’, we cannot ignore the 
specifically new qualities of this more recent mode of interconnection. I would 
suggest that the notion of road we use today relates to the transformation of historical 
awareness associated with ‘modernity’. Modernity is oriented not to the past or the 
present but the future. It wishes to tear up or radically restructure existing roads and 
create new ones on new kinds of non-traditional principles. In fact the newest kind of 
road is the one that takes us on a straight line out of the past and into the future.  
 
From this comes the association of road with modernization. This is historically the 
case – modernization programmes begin with road building, and these have been 
deliberately and often quite brutally pushed through against local opposition. I say 
‘local’ because all opposition to the universal future most be local, be it a village or a 
nation (such as Imperial China); so too it must be backwards looking or ‘reactionary. 
Marshall Berman’s reading of Goethe’s Faust is instructive here, as is the more well 
known example of Baron Haussman bulldozing the old Paris to make way for the 
Boulevards and Department Stores of a newly modernized city. In the name of 
progress sacrifices must be made and those who stand in its way can elicit only 
sympathy; to back down before their opposition would be to sacrifice the future. 
 
Robert Moses, the lead planner in New York in the 1940s and 1950s, famously said 
he ‘would take a meat axe to the Bronx’, a more honest account of urban renewal than 
we would expect to see nowadays. The ‘meat axe’ was the Cross Manhattan 
Expressway. Marshall Berman easily makes the link between this attitude to local 
communities and the US war machine that was then intent on bringing the benefits of 
civilization to Vietnam. 
 
In opposition to this notion of road was the street. The street also has a number of 
connotations. First, it shares with road a sense of movement and interconnection, but 
these are more to and fro, backwards and forwards. They trace the well-trodden paths 
of the everyday, the repeated rhythms and counterpoints of communal life. The street 
is messy. People bump into each other, they hang around in awkward places, they mix 
all sorts of activities and encounter the full spectrum of local society – including the 
stranger. The street has links to the Greek agora, the market and meeting place away 
from the more formal places of religion and democratic deliberation. In this sense it 
moves closer to the public square, where markets and popular assemblies might also 
take place.  
 
Through this link the street becomes a kind of alternative public space. The idea of 
the ‘public’ in European thought has been classically outlined by Habemas, who 
identifies a range of spaces and institutions (coffee houses, newspapers, political 
parties, institutions of learning, assembly rooms, religious meeting houses etc.) which 
gave rise to this public sphere. The street is its unruly cousin, and is often 
accompanied by ‘the mob’. Sometimes downright dangerous – as in 14th century Italy 
or 1970s New York – the street was also where the common people on the move 
(mobilus vulgas = mob) might rise up against the natural order or simply exercise its 
right to protest when laws, customs and tacit agreements were broken. It was during 
the French Revolution that the mob or the ‘crowd’ became ‘the people’; this was no 
longer a protest against bread prices but the voice of history speaking. Of course, once 
spoken the people was expected to go away, otherwise it could become again the 
incoherent ‘crowd’.  
 
The 19th and early 20th century city was one marked by this ambivalence between the 
‘people’ and the ‘crowd’. The former they still spoke in the voice of (modernizing) 
history, the latter were a dangerous, uncivilized remnant of a pre-democractic era. The 
street was the site of this ambiguity, as can be seen in the work of Walter Benjamin 
on Baudelaire’s Paris. Le Corbusier in The Radiant City calls for the death of the 
street, as symbol of both the urban chaos of the 19th century city and the potential for 
revolution that its dysfunctions created. The new city of modernity would erase social 
conflict at the same time as erasing the messiness of the street.  
 
The street also becomes the site of another conflict. Engels’ famous account of his 
first walk down a London street in The Condition of the British Working Class of 
1845 sees him shocked by the huge crowds on the street and how there is no social 
interaction other than the tacit agreement to stick to one side of the pavement. It is a 
symbol of mass urban alienation which Engels sees as a manifestation of capitalism. 
In his 1930s account of Paris in the 1840s and 1850s Walter Benjamin sees the 
Boulevard as creating such an alienated mass – as opposed to the older streets and 
arcades. This alienated mass is increasing seen as shoppers, urban consumers who 
occupy the street merely in order to walk between leisure attractions, department 
stores and cafes. The 1871 Commune ( the 9 hour film of which Maria Lind spoke at 
the workshop) has often been seen as the taking back the street. This is also the sense 
in which many demonstrations have seen themselves. May 1968 in Paris explicitly 
asserted the claims of everyday life on the streets of the capital as against those of 
consumption, administration and spectacle.  
 
In this sense the street is the local, communal and everyday. It is the unruly site of  a 
messy, more volatile public-crowd who speak (and sometimes shout) truth to power. 
Being in touch with the street is to ‘keep it real’, being aware of what is ‘really going 
on’. Stopping the street becoming a road is not just about the defense of the spaces of 
everyday life but about local empowerment, local connections, local markets, a claim 
to a democratic control not ‘up there’ but of the here and now of everyday life.  
 
Michel de Certeau in The Practice of Everyday Life counterpoised the messy, situated 
life of the street to the birds-eye view of the planner. Planners had strategies, those on 
the street had tactics. Planners tried to impose order, those on the street found ways to 
side-step and evade such order, not challenge head on but disappear, subvert, conduct 
guerilla warfare. This has been very popular but it has also been criticized; we cannot 
just walk the streets and leave the roads to the planners. The roads that have been built 
in the last 40 years are those of air transport, of massively expanded cargo trade, of 
huge pipelines and rail freight, and of course, the expensively dug out pipe-work 
which carries the digitalized information without which globalization would be 
impossible.  
 
These roads, like the turnpikes and canals of the 18th century Britain, or the railways 
of 19th century Europe and North America, can bye-pass whole localities. They are 
not bulldozed flat but made irrelevant. They demand not an end to roads but an 
equitable distribution of, or access to, roads. At the same time airports and roads and 
port expansions are opposed not just because they will destroy the local (though such 
motives are clearly still the case) but because they will destroy the global. The 
opposition is not the status quo, the local and the communal against this road; the 
opposition is in the name of the future against all roads, of the infinite expansion of 
such roads. 
 
Street demonstrations persist and they break out like a shock wave across the cities of 
North and South, East and West. They are all challenged as ‘undemocratic’ and 
‘illegitimate’ – in this way the street is as it ever was. But there are other streets which 
assert their version of the public and communal, their version of the democratic 
process against the road of modernization. The internet is currently the site of such 
conflicts, as the efficiency requirements of a free flow of information come into 
conflict with uses deemed inappropriate or dangerous. In some senses the internet is a 
new medium through which to communicate ideas, but it is also a new way of 
communicating, one that opens up many new possibilities for democratic 
participation. Of course the role of internet in a renewed, re-invented democracy can 
be overstated – these are aspirations which it cannot possibly fulfill without wider 
social, economic and political changes. The interesting thing is how this digital street 
is intersecting with the physical street to produce new kinds of networks, 
communities, value-chains, forums, agoras etc.  
 
MFEH 
 
In the light of the paper I submitted before the International workshop, and of my 
presentation at the same, it might be clear that I am making connections between 
road/ street and modernization/ modernity, the complex processes and forces of 
democracy, the connections of these to the lived experiences of local communities, 
and to the conflict between markets and capitalism which is intertwined with all these 
questions.  
 
What is also implied is a focus on the idea of the urban. This is referred to in many of 
the papers by Korean colleagues. We all know the central importance of the urban at a 
time of unprecedented growth of cities and concentrations of populations – and not 
least in Asia. Cities are made up and connected by roads and street, as they are central 
drivers of that modernization process which of which road is a metaphor.  
 
The space of the MFEH is huge, and for this reason looks to spaces such as the 
Turbine Hall at Tate Modern. How such a big space can be made to work at multiple 
levels is a question to be faced by the directorial team when appointed. But it seems to 
me that such a space might be suited to exploring the idea of the urban and the public, 
the road and the street by being itself a large public space. It has the scale appropriate 
to its theme.  
 
I agree with Sun Hong Kim that the MFEH is not just a exhibition space for the 
transmission of knowledge, that it should also be a place of free exploration and 
experimentation. What does this mean? Young Wook Lee refers to the roots of the 
MFEH in a creative industries strategy – and this is also clear from the the 
promotional material for the Hub City of Asian Culture. The MFEH somehow derives 
from the work of the Cultural Promotions Agency. As somebody involved in creative 
industries strategies in a number of cities and one of the founding chairs of the UK’s 
first local creative industries development agencies I would have welcomed more 
information on this. It is hard to fully engage with the MFEH without knowledge of 
this agency and its strategic vision. However, to re-assert what I said in the 
presentation, such a local creative industries strategy might benefit from re-thinking 
such a strategy from the point of view both of local sustainable economies and of 
local democratic culture. These two are not often put together by policy makers – 
economics is about growth and culture is left of communities; but there is a scope to 
bring these together. My presentation tried to relate cultural industry policies to social 
movements and ideas of local cultures and economies; things change and 
globalization is strong but there are many indications that these questions are coming 
back today.  
 
What would such a new creative city strategy look like? What sorts of spaces and 
interventions could a MFEH provide to enhance such an experiment?   
 
This might be linked to new approaches to the usage of urban informatics and other 
digital technologies. Cities worldwide are beginning to understand the potential for 
real-time urban information to help inform and democratise urban planning decisions, 
help visualise the changing dynamics of urban living and working, and deliver 
operations and services in real-time. Equally the role of digital technologies in 
facilitating virtual networking and knowledge work should not be opposed to the 
physical but seen in conjunction with it. These change the relationships between the 
finite physical space of the hub/ cluster and the more fluid space of digital networks.  
These present both design and programming challenges for the MFEH. But they 
provide a site on which new conceptions of the public, of democracy, of urban 
cultures and economies can be explored. They provide the possibility of new ways of 
representing and negotiating the complexities of the modern city living.  
 
There was a concern in all the papers for going beyond a unitary Asian-ness towards a 
recognition of left over or forgotten spaces, sub-cultures, shanty-towns, the local, the 
different. It would be impossible to do this without some engagement with the local 
city-region. To display the local, the disposed, the forgotten and not allow local input 
or representation would simply to aesthetisise this. The local most be incorporated – 
though not at the expense of everything else. Nowadays the roads of the media – 
digital and analogue – runs through the smallest of local streets. How will they access 
the space, how will they input into programming, how will they see themselves 
represented. In short – what use will it be to them? 
 
3. Gwanju’s Future? 
 
Written after a short study visit to the city and the site of the Multifunction 
Exhibition Centre 
 
Creativity and modernization – these have very different and very complex 
resonances in Asia. Road can express a direct route from the past to the future which 
over-rides the complex lived realities of the present.  
 
Creativity often uses the stark opposition of ‘contemporary’ to ‘traditional’ 
If often maps these onto elite/ closed and popular/ open.  
 
There are different modernities just as there are many contradictions of modernity.  
 
I would argue that creativity is placed back into these more complex debates – whose 
modernity? – and is linked to social movements for democratic participation in 
defining what kind of changes.  
 
This rather than a divergence between an unchanging and often meaningless or purely 
nostalgic national or Asian ‘essence’ and a unidirectional focus on future oriented 
‘growth’ we must put these in question. I would assert the multi-directional, messy, 
inhabited, public-private mix of ‘the street’ in opposition to ‘road’. 
 
Creative industries 
 
The digital commercial fast-growth industries of the future. 
 
This is illusion. Rates of growth have reached a ceiling. Highly uneven across 
geographies. Often highly exclusionary – creative class not ‘blue collar’. Seen as 
replacements for ‘dirty’ and ‘backwards’ manufacture’.  
 
Destructive of cities as they link to real estate projects; and link to identity and 
marketing strategies of city governments who go for abstract global brand rather than 
local strengths. 
 
They are implemented by economic development agencies which a) have little 
knowledge of the specific realities of cultural businesses (making money from 
meaning involves highly specific kinds of management and knowledge circuits 
b) focus on high growth sectors and ignore the wider ecosystem – the small scale and 
the low-profit – not entreprenuers but seeking to make a living out of which they 
thrive. C) look to ‘export’ and ‘inward investment’ as key to growth and ignore local 
value chains. 
 
Part of contestation of modernity is that ‘markets’ are not the same as capitalism. 
They are socially and culturally embedded, they are regulated in all sorts of ways – 
from medieval Asia and Europe to the Daein art market we saw yesterday in 
Gwangju. Capitalism is the principle of unlimited accumulation; not only did it 
become linked to city states and then nation states it is also deeply antithetical to 
markets. Part of the problems associated with globalization have been the dis-
embedding of markets – symbolized above all in the so called ‘financial markets’ 
which are not really markets and are certainly nothing to do with ‘production’.  
 
To build local industries you need to build on a local ‘ecosystem’ – on which local 
markets and their value circuits depend. But a lot of this activity is in the context of 
highly globalised activities – more so in the age of the internet. In this context ‘local’ 
is not prior to or outside globalization but part of it. The key question comes to be not 
about growing the sector to take advantage of global markets but to make it 
sustainable in order to give local social, cultural and economic value.  
 
This emphasis on sustainability of the local market and ecosystem should be the 
foundation of and cultural promotions agency.  
 
It should not be opposed to ‘old’ industry – it needs to recognize the existing skills 
and craft traditions that have growth up in industrialized cities. “Throw away your 
tool-box and pick up your lap-top” is deeply destructive. 
 
Re-industrial cities – how to re-think small scale industrial and craft production. 
Short value chains. Sustainable employment.  
 
Seoul had a classic micro ‘industrial district’ in Cheonggyecheon (introduced by the 
artist Jeon Yong-Seok). And in classic fashion it was cast out in the name of creative 
modernization. This happens on a grand scale in China.  
 
But here was a chance to link older skills with new kinds of thinking. Manchester’s 
fashion industry grew up in complete isolation from its historical textile industry. So 
maybe we can think of these kinds of creative input as the ‘new primary industries’ – 
resources that can be linked to older skills in the name of re-industrialiation. 
 
The MFEH is linked to the creative industries strategy just as much to the asian 
cultural hub idea. These are at present not really linked but they could be. Not could 
the cultural focus be on complex and contested modernities and democracy but its 
approach to CIs link to social movements and the older skills and communities that 
are on their way to beomcing a cast aside.  
 
It looks like being a cluster – and these have all sorts of problems which I have found 
in China. It needs to think about the ways in which it as a definitive and bounded 
space can link with the dispersed networks and communities of practice (not just 
creative industries) in the city and region. This is about its experimental vision, its 
organizational and function openness. 
 
It needs to connect with this city not just in the form of growth and commercialization 
but also sometime to enhance sustainability – which is about different kinds of 
intervention. 
 
It has to know how to visualize its connections – through its programming but also its 
use of social network technologies  - the possibilities for co-creation and participation 
have to be explored to their fullest. 
 
Needs to visualize its activities not just as a site, a container of activities but its links 
to the wider city – urban screens, live informatic feeds, different ways of representing  
the often invisible activities of the creative economy, the links to the world.  
 
It must connect with its immediate community or it will become like all the others and 
be useless waste of money. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
